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Abstract 
Planning modern military operations requires an accurate intelligence 
assessment of potential threats, combined with a detailed assessment of the 
physical theater of operations.  This information can then be combined with 
equipment and manpower resources to set up a logistically supportable operation 
that mitigates as much of the enemy threat as possible.  Given such a daunting 
challenge, military planners often turn to intelligent software agents to support their 
efforts.  The success of the mission often hinges on the accuracy of these plans and 
the integrity of the security umbrella provided. 
The purpose of this project is to provide a comprehensive assessment of the 
Joint Forces Protection Advanced Security System (JFPASS) Joint Concept 
Technology Demonstration (JCTD) to better meet force-protection needs.  It will also 
address the adaptability of this technology to an ever-changing enemy threat by the 
use of intelligent software.  This project will collect and analyze data pertaining to the 
research, development, testing, and effectiveness of the JFPASS and develop an 
operational effectiveness model to quantify overall system performance. 
Keywords: Joint, Protection, Security, Fusion, Interoperable, BCA, CBRN, 
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Executive Summary 
As of this writing, the Joint Force Protection Advanced Security System 
(JFPASS) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) is the newest initiative 
of this type and is sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). The 
goal of the JFPASS is to find a common core of communication protocols that will 
bring interoperability of legacy and future force protection systems in order to 
provide a better means of perimeter security. “The Army is the lead service in this 
endeavor and has provided the Transition Manager (XM).  The Navy provided the 
Technical Manager (TM), and the US European Command (EUCOM) has provided 
the Operational Manager (OM)” (Guardian Six, 2008, July 11).  
The JFPASS supports the Global War on Terror (GWOT) by providing 
Combatant Commands (COCOMs), services, agencies and our allies with near-real-
time, integrated/interoperable, comprehensive land and maritime-based regional and 
local Force Protection (FP) systems to counter threats. This is a precedent-setting 
solution to joint FP (2008, July 11). 
The JFPASS integrates Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and 
Explosive (CBRNE) and Physical Security systems through the application of an 
integrated Command and Control (C2) Architecture that uses tailored decision rules.  
The JFPASS provides actionable information and allows users to focus on arriving at 
the appropriate decisions.  The JFPASS JCTD architecture consists of nodes that 
together constitute a suite of sensors.  These nodes are connected to a C2 
system—rather than sensors connected directly to a C2 system (2008, July 21).  
Although the JFPASS is capable of connecting directly to sensors, the strength of 
the system is its ability to integrate legacy, existing, and emerging systems (2008, 
July 21).  Using intelligent software as the enabling agent, JFPASS will provide the 
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Current technologies, CONOPS, and policies do not provide a 
comprehensive, effective, and sustainable joint force protection capability.  Fielded 
force protection systems do not interoperate and integrate effectively nor do they 
provide comprehensive and integrated situational awareness. Existing service 
stovepipe systems need to be joined into a single, integrated FP system-of-systems.  
The JFPASS has the potential to enhance FP using unmanned systems, integration 
fusion, and analysis software systems; this means actionable information can be 
presented in a timely manner, allowing the warfighter (WF) to focus on orchestrating 
responses such as deploying Quick Reaction Forces (QRFs). The JFPASS can also 










This report presents an overview of the need for increased FP.  With a 
growing list of adversaries, including hostile states and transnational terrorist 
organizations, the nature of warfare has changed.  Accordingly, US forces have 
shifted from a command-and-control model to a sense-and-respond model (Lin, 
Luby, & Wang, 2004, December, p. 26).  Since the US Department of Defense 
(DoD) must respond to threats against American citizens or the military, it 
continuously explores new technologies to field capable force protection 
equipment. 
As the largest defense organization in the free world, the DoD recognizes 
the need for the safety and protection of its fighting forces.  The Joint Force 
Protection Advance Security System (JFPASS) can improve current FP to a 
highly effective level.  It is centered on integrating communication protocols and 
applying commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technologies to provide superior force 
protection capability in and around Forwarding Operating Bases (FOBs).   
For the purpose of this report, an FOB is any secured forward position that 
is used to support tactical operations. An FOB may contain an airfield, hospital or 
other facility, and it may or may not be used for an extended period of time. 
FOBs are traditionally supported by main operating bases.  For example, an FOB 
can reduce reaction time and increase time-on-task in deploying a patrol force.  
In its most basic form, an FOB consists of a ring of barbed wire around a position 
with a fortified entry control point (ECP). More advanced FOBs include 
assemblies of earthen dams, concrete barriers, gates, watchtowers, bunkers and 
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B. Background 
In the course of this project, the team conducted a literature review.  The 
background provides the foundation regarding problems in the DoD’s 
communication and interoperability of force protection systems.  Also, the project 
will show how potential solutions to this problem are being assessed through the 
JCTD process. 
C. Problem Statement 
As the JFPASS JCTD Management and Transition Plan explains, 
“Currently, U.S. Joint and coalition FP systems are inadequate and lack the 
ability to provide comprehensive, effective sustainable FP and critical asset 
protection capabilities” (Guardian Six, 2008, July 11). The researchers in this 
study will assess the JFPASS as a solution to this problem. 
D. Research Questions 
Our primary aim is to help assess the extent to which the JFPASS can 
increase ability to enhance joint service force protection against an adaptive 
threat.  The project will focus on the following research questions:  
 How do the services operate with current security measures and 
actions, and is there a robust adaptability to changing threats? 
 What types of management structures are used to assess security 
measures?  Are they contracted services? 
 What types of training are required for Force Protection (FP) 
personnel to operate and/or implement within the joint forces 
community when received? 
 To what extent do the respective military services acquire and 
manage force protection equipment/services separately?  Is this 
beneficial to the DoD acquisition strategy? 
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 What benefits does the JFPASS provide relative to what is already 
used? 
 What is the "force protection" model used to design the JFPASS?  
 Is the JFPASS a single-scenario design (e.g., expeditionary units 
like SEALS, Rangers, or LRSC)?  Or is it designed for a broad 
range of applications?   
E. Benefits of Research 
The JFPASS has the potential to facilitate a more efficient use of 
resources both operationally and logistically.  Specifically, this research project 
will: 
 Support an assessment of the suitability of the JFPASS 
JCTD for transition to a Program of Record (POR), 
 Contribute to a comprehensive understanding of joint force 
protection acquisition and of the adaptability of the force 
protection means currently in use, 
 Provide information that can be incorporated into 
recommendations for future force protection acquisitions by 
means of intelligent software, 
 Assess the utility of the JFPASS concept of COTS 
interoperability, and 
 Investigate the possibility of future uses of the JFPASS in 
homeland defense against possible terrorist activities. 
F. Methodology 
For this project, we used an exploratory case study as our primary 
methodology. We employed a triangulation method to gather qualitative data.  
Three points were considered: interviews of JFPASS JCTD program 
representatives, relevant publications, and an exploratory survey of force 
protection reports.  We used the survey to map five key force protection tasks to 
eight desired capabilities in order to asses the relative importance of each 
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used to build a utility function as a metric for the JFPASS’s operational capability.  
The research team believes the following areas pose the greatest problems in FP 
at present: (1) adaptability (speed), (2) interoperability (plug-and-play), and (3) 
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II. Background 
A. Current Problem 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, resulted in a renewed interest 
in FP.  A variety of new products—ranging from fire-resistant clothing to 
unmanned aerial vehicles—received serious DoD attention.  The challenge is 
now in the integration of the available products into one cohesive and adaptable 
system.   
Base defense is a key component of the force protection mission.  The 
JFPASS JCTD Management and Transition Plan explains:  
The problem is the result of outdated capabilities, Concept of Operations 
(CONOPS) and policies.  The excessive variants and redundancies in FP 
capabilities limit the Joint Force in its ability to share information across 
the services, agencies and partner nations.  The outdated information and 
data exchange standards also limit the ability of the services, agencies 
and our partner nations to share and exchange data in order to maintain 
situational awareness of an ever vigilant and changing threat.  The myriad 
of FP systems and inconsistent standards between systems severely limit 
their ability to communicate warnings rapidly from a single node to 
subordinate units and commands throughout the services and agencies.  
The limited interoperability between the various systems increases the 
total cost of ownership for FP systems due to inefficient manpower 
utilization and the high cost of maintaining multiple systems and spare 
parts.  The current problem causes an unacceptable level of risk for critical 
and sensitive asset protection as well as unaffordable costs associated 
with operating and maintaining these different systems. (2008, July 11) 
However, the technology development response has been sluggish thus 
far.  BG Phillip Coker, Director of Capabilities Developments at the Futures 
Center at Army Training and Doctrine Command, states, “It is important to think 
through and find the right solutions, not solve the wrong problem” (Roosevelt, 
2004, June 3, p. 1).  In order to do so, the US must focus our efforts on a 
systematic approach to finding and implementing the right solutions to real-world 
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B. Current DoD Force Protection Guidance 
Since September 11, 2001, the DoD has been proactive in protecting its 
infrastructures and personnel from acts of terrorism.  DoDI 2000.16 addresses 
the DoD’s antiterrorism (AT) standards and is applicable to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff, Combatant Commands, Defense Agencies, DoD Field Activities, and all 
other DoD organizational entities (DoD, 2006, October 2, p. 2).   The Instruction 
further addresses the DoD’s policy and responsibilities as follows: 
1. To protect DoD personnel, their families, installations, facilities, 
information, and other material resources from terrorist acts; 
2.  To establish AT standards for the Department of Defense; 
3. That commanders at all levels shall have the authority to enforce 
security measures and are responsible for protecting persons and 
property subject to their control; 
4. That Geographic Combatant Commander AT policies and programs 
shall take precedence over all AT policies or programs of any DoD 
Component operating or existing in that command’s area of responsibility 
(AOR) except for those under the security responsibility of a Chief of 
Mission (COM); 
5. That the DoD elements and personnel not falling under the AT policies 
and programs of a geographic Combatant Commander […], shall comply 
with the Overseas Security Policy Board Security Standards; 
6. That non-DoD tenants on a DoD installation, facility, or other DoD 
property must comply with all aspects of the DoD AT program addressed 
in this Instruction and other AT guidance documents; and 
7. That functional Combatant Commanders will support geographic 
Combatant Commanders as they exercise overall AT responsibility within 
their AOR. (2006, October 2, p. 2) 
C. Force Protection Conditions 
DoD Force Protection Conditions (FPCONs) is a DoD-approved system 
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terrorist attacks.  The five progressive FPCON levels of force protection are listed 
below: 
1. FPCON NORMAL: Applies when a general global threat of 
possible terrorist activity exists and warrants a routine 
security posture. At a minimum, access control will be 
conducted at all DoD installations and facilities. 
2. FPCON ALPHA: Applies when there is an increased general 
threat of possible terrorist activity against personnel or 
facilities, and the nature and extent of the threat are 
unpredictable. ALPHA measures must be capable of being 
maintained indefinitely. 
3. FPCON BRAVO: Applies when an increased or more 
predictable threat of terrorist activity exists. Sustaining 
BRAVO measures for a prolonged period may affect 
operational capability and military-civil relationships with 
local authorities. 
4. FPCON CHARLIE: Applies when an incident occurs or 
intelligence is received indicating some form of terrorist 
action or targeting against personnel or facilities is likely.  
Prolonged implementation of CHARLIE measures may 
create hardship and affect the activities of the unit and its 
personnel. 
5. FPCON DELTA: Applies in the immediate area where a 
terrorist attack has occurred or when intelligence has been 
received that terrorist action against a specific location or 
person is imminent. This FPCON is usually declared as a 
localized condition. FPCON DELTA measures are not 
intended to be sustained for an extended duration. (DoD, 
2006, October 2, p. 39) 
Each FPCON level encompasses site-specific AT security measures.  
FPCON protective measures are used to assist DoD components in reducing the 
risks of terrorist attacks and other security threats to DoD personnel, units, and 
activities (2006, October 2, p. 39).  Upon declaration of an FPCON level, 
commanders are responsible to immediately implement all applicable AT security 
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competent authority (2006, October 2, p. 40).   Baseline FPCON levels and 
applicable measures are listed in Enclosure 4 of DoDI 2000.16.  The instruction 
lists shipboard security measures separately; these are tailored to assist 
commanding officers and ship masters in reducing the effect of terrorist and other 
security threats to DoD combatant and non-combatant vessels—including US 
Army and Military Sealift Command ships worldwide (2006, October 2, p. 40). 
D.  What is a JCTD? 
This Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program has 
entered its third year of exploring new ways to provide a greater advantage 
against changing threats.  The following is an excerpt from the JCTD Program 
Practical Operating Guidelines (POG) (DoD, 2008, April 11):  
The Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD) Program attempts 
to improve turnaround time from operational problem identification to 
operational capability. The Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for 
Advanced Systems and Concepts (DUSD [AS&C]) initiated the JCTD 
program in 2006 as a result of a top-down review of the Advanced 
Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) Program. In Fiscal Year (FY) 
2006, the DUSD (AS&C) initiated the JCTD Program to enhance and 
accelerate the support to the joint, coalition and interagency WF’s and 
users in this era of the global war on terrorism.  
In that regard, the JCTD model is oriented to fill specific warfighter (WF) 
needs.  Application of the model is an effective method for the DoD to fill 
requirements by emphasizing a “needs pull” over a “technology push” 
methodology, as the following statements attest (US DoD Announces, 2008, 
January 30):  
 A JCTD enables faster project start-up by providing more resources 
earlier in the traditional two-year DoD budget cycle and a flexible 
start process that facilitates urgently needed combatant command-
driven capabilities throughout the fiscal year. 
 A key aspect of the JCTD program is the transition planning 
process, which seeks to deliver enduring capabilities to the 
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 The JCTD program also demands faster fielding of interim 
capabilities [and] structures funding to provide incentives for military 
service and agency participation without requiring the services or 
agencies clear visibility in their participation of joint efforts. (2008, 
January 30)  
 The JCTD model seeks the 70%–80% solution now, rather than 
delaying delivery to obtain the 100% answer years from now (DoD, 
2008, April 11).  The advantage the JFPASS gains from the JCTD 
model is the streamlining process and utilization of current 
technologies to meet the 70%–80% objective. 
E.  What is the JFPASS? 
The JFPASS is the “fusion cell” of a Command and Control software suite 
designed to create the interoperability of numerous COTS, enhancing FP for an 
array of units. This will allow all branches of the US military to harness the 
benefits of one joint force protection system. Intelligent software is the primary 
means in which the JFPASS intends to accomplish providing the enhanced FP. 
1.  Scope of the JFPASS JCTD 
One recent article (US DoD announces, 2008, January 30) elaborates on 
the scope of the JFPAS system: 
JFPASS—integrates and automates access control and perimeter security 
for expeditionary military installations. JFPASS demonstrates an 
integrated system-of-systems to protect expeditionary military installations, 
incorporates comprehensive situational awareness for force protection 
providers, reduces manning due to systems integration and robotics, and 
reduces logistics cost. Functional areas for installation protection 
addressed include: perimeter security, chemical-biological-radiological 
defense, access control, nonintrusive inspection, and waterside security. 
(p. 2) 
2. What the JFPASS Provides 
This same article explains the benefits the system is expected to provide: 
JFPASS JCTD will provide improved situational awareness to protect 
humans from unnecessary risks, and facilitate the processes of detecting, 
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capability.  The focus will be on the response within Detect, Assess, and 
Warn functions.  Enablers for response are the COP and the use of 
connected Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) and unmanned systems, 
through the integration of legacy systems and automated responses. 
(2008, January 30, p. 2)  
 
 
Figure 1.   Desired Capabilities Provided by the JFPASS 
(Guardian Six, 2008, July 11) 
As seen in Figure 1, the JFPASS has the potential to bring protection 
support from fort to foxhole by providing next-generation passive capabilities 
(Guardian Six, 2008, July 11). In order to accomplish this, the JFPASS will have 
to incorporate new technology—not just hardware but software as well. 
According to Mr. Carlos Lama, the JFPASS JCTD Program Manager, 
current “force protection systems are disjointed and inefficient” (2008, July 21).  
His statement affirms the need for a joint security system that can be used 
anywhere by any branch in austere locations against an unknown threat.  
Additionally, the DoD recognizes that current force protection technologies do not 
provide a comprehensive, effective, and sustainable joint force protection 
capability (2008, July 21).  Current systems create waste through redundancy 
 Unmanned Systems 
 Common Operational Picture 
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and misuse of limited manpower and, therefore, do not provide the situational 
awareness needed by the WF (2008, July 21).  Prior to this JCTD, there was no 
indication of a systematic approach to address such shortfalls.   
The lack of a future DoD force protection vision has been a barrier to 
resolving such a problem.  The Army is keenly aware of this problem:  “Gen. 
Peter Schoomaker, Army Chief of Staff, tasked his subordinates to find science 
and technology solutions for the current and future force gaps and, where 
possible, accelerate fielding of future capabilities to improve current force 
effectiveness” (Roosevelt, 2004, June 3, p. 1).  Disjointed supply lines and 
maintenance/repair capabilities also fragment the effectiveness of current force 
protection equipment issued to WFs.  
Interoperability is an essential element in the success of any system 
designed to defeat a changing threat.  The needs to reduce risk, increase 
effective Command and Control (C2) and reduce cost are catalysts for the 
development of the JFPASS for base defense.  However, interoperability and the 
aforementioned elements are not the sole considerations.  Speed is also a key 
element in the development of the JFPASS.  Speed in set-up, becoming 
operational, break-down, and transport are essential to the light, elite units that 
will find this system most useful.  Is there a speed versus interoperability trade-off 
that needs to be addressed? This is a question that must be answered by the 
WF.  
In their December 2007 NPS study, D'Angelo, Houglan, and Ruckwardt 
state:  
Service components are responsible to train and equip the WF while 
geographical combatant commands conduct military wartime contingency 
operations. Each service provides trained and equipped forces to the 
combatant commanders—giving the commanders the capability to 
execute contingency operations. Although these capabilities consist of 
each service’s core competencies, the combatant commanders are left 
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Agencies outside the DoD need to conduct research and development of 
technology that can provide systems to keep the military ahead of its adversaries 
and the US safe by filling that void. Exploring intelligent software to alleviate 
some of the burden placed on manpower can assist in this problem. 
F. The Purpose of the JFPASS 
The JFPASS can potentially fill a national force protection need.  Its 
adaptability may be broad enough to allow an application to homeland defense 
applications as well as military perimeter security. 
As stated in the overview, the overriding objective of this project is to 
analyze the effectiveness and adaptability of the JFPASS in defeating the ever-
changing enemy threat. This project will investigate, analyze and assess the 
JFPASS. In addition, this project will provide the basis for our recommendation 
and assessment of the potential of the JFPASS to become a program of record. 
G. Five Tasks of the JFPASS 
The following five FP tasks are key elements to the system effectiveness 
of the JFPASS, according to the JFPASS JCTD MTP (Guardian Six, 2008, July 
11): 
1. Detect:  The JFPASS will demonstrate the ability to detect threats 
using an integrated system of sensors (including cameras, radar, 
and CBRNE detection) and automated anomaly detection and 
alarming; these capabilities will reduce the need for human 
interaction with the system and will provide consistent detection 
probability results.  The synergistic effect between sensor data and 
the JFPASS fusion engine will result in an improved response both 
in the time required to recognize a threat and the ability to do so at 
greater distances from vital assets.   
2. Assess:  The JFPASS will integrate the sensors into an 
automated, centrally controlled processing station(s), which will 
evaluate the input from each of the sensor systems. The JFPASS 
will automate the assessment process by comparing the nature of 
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of any known threat; by doing so, it will assess the potential for the 
anomaly to become a threat (i.e., presence of explosive 
components or precursors). The JFPASS will then automatically 
provide the system operator with recommended courses of action. 
3. Warn:  The JFPASS will automate the process of disseminating 
alerts and warnings over a multi-tiered/multi-mode communications 
system—ranging from loud speakers to automated emails and text 
messages. The system will provide situational awareness and 
information for decision-makers.  An inter-networked system of the 
JFPASS-enabled units, bases and installations will disseminate 
warnings in order to mitigate the effects of dispersed, coordinated 
attacks.   
4. Defend:  The JFPASS will automate the defense actions by 
centrally managing the deployment of passive defensive measures 
and by providing the local commander with situational awareness 
regarding the status of the defensive measures.  These measures 
include, but are not limited to, the recommendation to implement a 
change in the FP Condition (FPCON), the automatic deployment of 
barriers and the use of robotics for threat intervention. 
5. Recover:  Although the JFPASS will not directly contribute to the 
recovery function, the synergistic effect of integration and 
automation within the other areas of the FP construct will help in 
resuming effective operations and provide a deterrent against 
further attacks. (2008, July 21) 
H. Operational Benefits 
The operational aims of the JFPASS are to integrate, automate, and 
leverage the benefits of integrated systems for joint force protection.  The 
JFPASS will address this need by integrating C2 Architecture and will include the 
following, taken from a PowerPoint presentation created by Lama (2007, October 
24) which indicates the benefits: 
 Standard/scalable connectivity (plug-and-play), 
 Common and integrated operational picture, 
 Decision support system, 
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 Affordable logistics and maintenance.  
I. Summary of Chapter II 
This chapter discussed the need for the DoD’s use of new technology to 
provide WFs with a better defense against a varied and changing threat. The 
JFPASS is intended to enhance force protection by providing a base defense 
security system that can detect, detour, and defeat a wide range of threats, while 
making efficient use of financial and manpower resources. This chapter outlined 
the rationale for the JCTD model in general and the JFPASS in particular. 
Chapter III will explore the envisioned capabilities and uses the JFPASS will 
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III. Envisioned Capabilities and Uses 
A. Desired Capabilities 
JFPASS potentially offers new and desired capabilities to the WF in the 
FP arena. With the threat of attacks coming from multiple enemies, a robust 
system is needed to provide better and more accurate information about the 
threat. The JFPASS aims to do this with the following: 
1. Near Real-time/Integrated/Interoperable, Comprehensive Land and 
Maritime-based Reg balanced Local Force Protection (FP) 
Systems;  
2. Common Operating Picture (COP) tailored to suit the user’s 
information requirements and built from fused sensor and other 
information sources; 
3. Scalable FP area of interest to support a single integrated group 
(military and civilian); 
4. Compliance with regional requirements (e.g., laws, regulations, 
SOFAs); 
5. Suite of systems under a central core, ability to share information 
(voice data and video) with subordinate units, higher headquarters, 
and adjacent C2 nodes; 
6. Standardized core systems training, common baseline of 
equipment, interface, and training standards which reduces the 
total lifecycle cost of ownership and facilitates the plug and play use 
of components among the services and our coalition partners; 
7. Internationally releasable system suite (between partner nations); 
8. A decision aide to select a system suite for various 
applications/environments; and 
9. CONOPS and TTPs developed for the employment of the 
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B.  Interoperability 
The JFPASS aims to incorporate comprehensive situational awareness to 
reduce manning through the use of systems integration and robotics.  According 
to the JFPASS JCTD MTP, the system: 
will maximize COTS hardware and software while leveraging existing FP 
systems.  To minimize the impact to legacy interfaces/standards the 
JFPASS JCTD will apply SEIWG ICD-0100 as the standard 
communication/data exchange protocol.  This approach allows the 
JFPASS JCTD to minimize changes to communications systems or 
networks while at the same time maintaining the ability to revert to legacy 
systems.  In addition, this approach provides a systems architecture with 
no single point of failure and plug and play functionality. (2008, July 21) 
While complex in explanation, the physical system is simple.  The graphic 
in Figure 2 depicts the systems nodes and the systems resident at each node to 
support the JFPASS JCTD operations.  It also identifies the interfaces between 
the systems and the systems’ nodes.  As illustrated, the core technology of the 
JFPASS JCTD is the Fusion Automation and Decision Support System (DSS) 








Figure 2.   Conceptual Systems View of the JFPASS 
(Guidance Six, 2008, July 11) 
In order to augment the system, certain external components can enhance 
detection ability.  These include thermal imaging, mobile patrol, and radars. 
Infrared detectors can be used to help find targets at night or in complete 
darkness.  Such technology could be helpful to combat night attacks.   
Mobile patrol sensors, such as unmanned patrol craft, can be used on 
land, air, or sea.  This technology can be mounted on land vehicles, small boats, 
or aircraft.  The US Army has installed a version of this technology on its Mobile 
Detection Response System (MDARS). This new technology has been 
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such as SQUIRE can be used to detect moving ground targets.  This technology 
can be used to protect oil fields, bridges, waterways, and other valuable sites.     
The aforementioned technologies are further explained by Endress (2007, 
July), an expert in Security Management: 
 Thermal Imaging Technology—objects detection and identification, 
tracking, surveillance, threat warning, damage assessment, and 
communications.  Examples of this technology are found in optical 
target designators, radars, laser rangefinders/designators, and vehicle-
mounted Infrared Search and Track and Forward-Looking Infrared 
packages in combination with secure real-time data links and decision 
and navigation aids;  
 Mobile Patrols—same as thermal Imaging Technology but conducted 
at sea, air, or ground.  Examples of mobile patrols are found in naval 
patrol boats and surveillance aircraft;  
 Ground Surveillance Radars—protect airports, industrial processing 
facilities, power plants, or areas of special interest by detecting terrorist 
activities and illegal infiltration.  Examples of this are the SQUIRE 
Surveillance radar and the EL/M-2128 Miniature Detection Radar, 
often referred to as MINDER. (pp. 79-80) 
The JFPASS will be utilized to facilitate control of various “off-the-shelf” 
surveillance systems to protect US military assets, infrastructures, and people 
from terrorist attacks. 
C.  Existing Capabilities and Needs 
Integrated security systems such as Tactical Automated Security System 
(TASS) served as the predecessor to the JFPASS.  TASS developer Col Russell 
Peter, USAF stated in an interview conducted by Air Force News Service 
(Heitman, 1998) that the challenge is to develop a force protection system that is 
integrated with the many other systems already being employed  (p. 1).  A shift in 
force protection priorities that Col Peter observed in 1997 was toward the 
protection of people rather than high-value areas (p. 1).  Peter claimed, "In the 
past, most of the effort has been to protect weapons storage areas or high value 
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With terrorist activity becoming so common, we have to worry about truck bombs, 
for instance" (p. 3). 
Force protection integration not only includes current weapon systems but 
also infrastructure such as medical staff, civil engineers, and communication 
systems.  Representatives from some of these areas have deployed abroad to 
help establish security systems.  This move is in sharp contrast to the traditional 
military security teams who had the exclusive responsibility of setting up the 
perimeter security system (p. 3). 
Increased awareness of what is happening in this “stand-off” area can 
lead to enhanced force protection. With more threat warning, people and assets 
can be better protected from terrorists (p. 3).  According to Col Peter, a key 
element to the future of force protection is looking beyond the base perimeter; he 
stated, “observing what is happening in the ‘stand-off’ area outside of the gate 
can provide a valuable early warning to impending danger” (p. 2).  A system such 
as the JFPASS can provide additional portable force protection against 
immediate threats similar to TASS (Carey, 1998, January 1).  
The force protection function has been historically dedicated to physical 
security, but the TASS program has been expanded in order to integrate 
intelligence functions and provide enhanced detection and assessment of 
intrusions to designated sites and their perimeter areas (1998, January 1). Col 
Peter explained: 
Our goal was to develop a security system that would overcome 
problems—the labor-intensive nature, complex installation, cabling 
requirements—that traditional security systems posed for segments of the 
military that required mobility and rapid deployment. A mobile, modular-
type security system, one that was wireless, that would work during the 
dark desert nights, that could be put together and transported on not more 
than two airplane pallets, and that could be ready to go in the event of an 
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The advance warning or notification, however, was impossible to achieve 
at that time.  In November 1997 (Heitman), Col Peter said, ”Modeling and 
simulation can show us where the threat zones are, so we know where we need 
to put more people or sensors”; yet, he added that “no specific systems fill this 
gap, but by combining things like unmanned aerial vehicles, satellites and other 
existing technologies, force protection needs can be filled” (p. 2). Peter’s 
explanation was expanded in a separate article (Carey, 1998, January 1): “Our 
vision for this new program office is to be a world class leader in applying 
technology to force protection command and control systems for the safety, 
security and survivability of US warfighting assets, WFs and dependents 
worldwide.” 
Many of the JFPASS’ specific capabilities already exist.  Internal to the 
Army, funding for a new development program called the Mobile Detection 
Assessment and Response System (MDARS) is ongoing.  This system consists 
of an autonomous vehicle designed to provide “intrusion detection and inventory 
assessment” (Tiron, 2004, May).  Equipped with various radars for both scanning 
and navigating, it can be programmed to patrol an area and record anything 
within radar range.  The platform also includes an RFID sensor that can inventory 
material inside secure storage locations or containers (2004, May).   
Other equipment for possible integration includes an HMMWV with a 30-
foot radar mast added to the top.  Vehicles such as this can be temporarily 
positioned in strategic locations to provide detailed coverage for a surveillance 
area.   
The Mobil Detection Assessment and Response System (MDARS) is 
designed to operate with the Army’s future combat systems or other unmanned 
vehicles with little assistance from the end user.  The MDARS can be upgraded 
with various communication/interrogation packages to fit particular mission needs 
and particular platforms.  Everything from an all-weather surface detection to 
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with this system on an array of different platforms.  This could be an important 
system to expand the JFPASS component capability.    
However, the MDARS does not solve the interoperability problem.  Adding 
more equipment to the mission is subject to diminishing marginal returns. 
Interoperability is the answer, not more equipment. 
D.  Development of the JFPASS 
ViaLogy LLC, a subsidiary of ViaLogy PLC, was chosen by the DoD for 
joint experiments to develop Joint Forces Protection and Base Security Systems 
to support the JFPASS JCTD. ViaLogy was selected to provide a command and 
control (C2) platform for the experiments (London Stock Exchange, 2007, April 
30). At a recent integration assessment supporting the JFPASS, two systems—
Northrop Grumman’s TASS and Joint Battlespace Command and Control Station 
(JBC2S) for unmanned systems—successfully demonstrated interoperability 
(2007, April 30).  ViaLogy claims that it “has also integrated a Lightweight 
Chemical Detector (LCD) to validate the ‘plug-and-play’ capability intended for 
JFPASS. The LCD is part of the soldiers’ hand-held equipment and is used for 
checking cargo, personnel or buildings for chemical warfare agents” (p. 1). 
According to ViaLogy CTO, Dr. Sandeep Gulati, “JFPASS’s real-time 
requirements present an ideal problem set for their Sensor Policy Manager 
(SPM).  The product is designed for scalable implementations involving 100s to 
1000s of sensors and video endpoints” (2007, April 30, p. 2).  However, due to 
budgetary pressures and the new JCTD model of streamlining programs, 
affordability will be essential to the program’s viability and success. As indicated 
by ViaLogy, the need for increased force protection 
will drive procurement of new standards-based commercial-off-the shelf 
(COTS) products and interoperability solutions. Emerging sensors such as 
smart electronic fence, intrusion detection radars and video surveillance 
offer promising solutions for threat detection and rapid response and base 
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detection systems over a secure network into a highly reliable “system-of-
systems” with both lethal and non-lethal response capabilities has also 
increased significantly. (2007, April 30, p. 2) 
Numerous COTS technologies can provide a synergy of support, which 
will greatly increase the effectiveness of the JFPASS.  For example, Delta 
Scientific SC3000 gates were recently installed at Naval Station Pearl Harbor.  
Some of the technology employed in these access systems can be used in other 
perimeter security systems.  For example, the SC3000 utilizes an RFID tag 
placed on authorized vehicles (2007, April 30).  Rather than having a sentry grant 
access, vehicles need only pull within range of the sensor for the gate to 
recognize the pre-authorized vehicle and grant access.  These systems can even 
employ RFID tags that operate without batteries.  Such passive systems reflect 
the RF signal back to the reader in order to unlock the security device. RFID gate 
technology could be another valuable piece of a complete JFPASS system.  
RFID technology can serve as a key component to automating numerous 
aspects of a total security system. This new technology can be incorporated into 
the JFPASS Decision Support System (DSS) for future use. 
E. The JFPASS Used for Infrastructure 
Critical infrastructures are important.  The US Patriot Act defines critical 
infrastructure as those “systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital 
to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and 
assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, 
national public health,  safety, or any combination of those matters” (National 
Strategy for Homeland Security, 2002, pp. 29-30).  Therefore, any terrorist attack 
aimed at these facilities could cause grave damage to the US economy and to 
the safety of its citizens.   
While not specifically mentioning the JFPASS or the changing enemy 
threat environment, Christian Endress (2007, July), editor for Safety and Security 
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several new technologies designed to secure critical assets against enemy 
attacks (p. 79).  In a recent article (2007, July), Endress observed that the 
number of “critical infrastructure targets” in Europe alone is staggering (p. 80).  If 
critical infrastructure is taken to be anything that is “critical for economic 
prosperity”—to include entities with important interactions with other elements—
then the number is truly mind-boggling (p. 80).  Anything from the water supply to 
the telecommunications system can be a potential target. 
Nations, therefore, have a vested interest in developing security systems 
that can help protect critical infrastructure.  As Endress (2007, July) points out, 
fully protecting a critical asset may be extremely difficult but setting up a 
surveillance system to watch over those potential targets is inherently better than 
not providing any sort of security.  Of course, the cost of a surveillance system is 
a key consideration in acquired levels of protection. 
Perimeter security products can be employed as another layer of defense.  
While observation-based systems may not stop an attack, they provide critical 
early warning about impending danger.  
Numerous countries have focused on methods of protecting critical 
infrastructure.  In the United States, the Department of Homeland Security has 
identified 17 critical infrastructures and key resources sectors:  
 Agriculture and Food  
 Banking and Finance  
 Chemical Production  
 Commercial Facilities 
 Communications  
 Dams  
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 Emergency Systems 
 Energy 
 Government Facilities 
 Information Technology  
 National Monuments and Icons 
 Nuclear Reactors, Materials and Waste 
 Postal and Shipping  
 Public Health and Health Care 
 Transportation Systems 
 Water (Department of Homeland Security, 2007a 
Should these critical infrastructures become damaged, destroyed, or 
contaminated, this nation’s security, economy, public health, safety, or a 
combination thereof could be jeopardized (2002).   
F.  Summary of Chapter III 
In this chapter, we have discussed the need for increased force protection 
on and around forward operating bases as well as other primary installations.  
JFPASS JCTD research and development shows numerous applicable COTS 
technologies.  In order to create a system synergy, a common communication 
protocol is required to enhance the interoperability of the system-of-systems.  
The JFPASS is a JCTD that can make an immediate impact.  In short, this 
technology network can provide the capability to meet the changing enemy threat 
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IV. Defining the JFPASS 
A.  Introduction 
A commander’s need for accurate and timely information in support of 
complex decisions requires that application programs, intelligent agents and 
humans be able to exchange, analyze, interpret and report information. While 
interoperability of soldiers has traditionally been accomplished through the 
creation of tacit and explicit knowledge through training, construction of software 
applications and intelligent agents for training programs, the evolution of 
technology requires a standardized vocabulary and semantically rich 
formalization of common-sense knowledge for the various domains of operation 
spanned by military planning and operations. This formalization is appropriately 
captured in ontologies (specifications of conceptualizations) that provide 
representation vocabularies and facilitates information exchange (Burk et al., 
2007). 
This chapter provides a detailed description of the JFPASS, which 
provides the information of value added.  In Chapters II and III, the process in 
which the JFPASS would provide the WF with an advantage was described by 
explaining how FP would be increased and which  systems would be used.  The 
JFPASS would interface current FP systems that would, in turn, increase the 
interoperability of COTS and decrease an enemy threat.   
Interoperability has always been a primary objective of any program within 
the DoD development and acquisition process.  However, recently this concept 
has been expanded to include the application of what maturing technology can 
provide the military and what the JFPASS can provide the WF, which is volumes 
of data and pertinent intelligent information. First, we must define four key words 
that are the baseline for understanding the JFPASS. They are as follows, 
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Automation: Combining data points to automatically perform a task 
otherwise done by an operator.  
Integration: As defined in the JFPASS JCTD, there are two 
aspects that determine full integration.  First, the 
fundamental aspect of “technical” integration is the 
baseline requirement for a system/technology to work 
within the digital architecture of the JCTD utilizing ICD-
0100b.  Second, the integrated component must be 
fully controllable from any BC station or operator 
station. 
Interoperability: Joint Publication 1-02 defines interoperability as “1. 
The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of 
assigned tasks. 2. The condition achieved among 
communications-electronics systems or items of 
communications-electronics equipment when 
information or services can be exchanged directly and 
satisfactorily between them and/or their users.”   
Fusion: Fusion may be defined as a series of processes 
performed to transform observational data into more 
detailed and refined information, knowledge, and 
understanding. 
Additionally, intelligence and context are key contributors to the JFPASS. 
B. What Does “Intelligence” Mean to the JFPASS? 
How do researchers talk about intelligence in the context of a machine?  
Some could argue that even though a computer is able to store vast amounts of 
data and is capable of processing millions of computations per second, it is 
nevertheless only a machine that is entirely restricted to following predefined 
instructions (Pohl, 2004). Based on this perception, it is important to briefly 
discuss the concept of intelligence and the sense in which this perception is 
applied to computer software (2004). 
Intelligence within a machine differs from a human’s path toward a new 
idea or solution to an existing problem.  Both use pre-existing relationships to 
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of the human and the human is restricted by experience and education.  Some 
might argue that machines are bound only by their predefined instructions.  The 
same argument applies, in a sense, to humans—growth and education 
determine the ability to discover the means to understand empirical data. By 
comparison, computers, despite their restrictions, can evolve much faster than 
humans can. Where humans take generations for evolution to occur in their 
intellectual abilities, well-designed computers revolutionize capabilities within 
years.  These abilities greatly differ due to the advancements in technology over 
the last twenty years.  
In his paper, Dr. Pohl states: 
Webster’s Dictionary defines intelligence as the ‘…capacity for learning, 
reasoning, and understanding.” This definition suggests that there are 
component capabilities that contribute to the concept of intelligence. 
Further, these component capabilities are not necessarily powerful. In 
other words, it may be argued that there are levels of intelligence and that 
at the lowest level such capabilities must include at least the ability to 
remember. Higher levels of intelligence include reasoning, learning, 
discovering, and creating. Certainly at least some of these intelligent 
capabilities can be embedded in computer software. (2004) 
Intelligent software has the ability to create relations needed by building 
an ontology with all pre-existing systems, thus providing support to the growing 
demand for information that is accurate, timely and high quality.  However, the 
information is only as good as the context it is provided. 
C. Why is Context Important in Defining the JFPASS?  
A current myth is that computers are the backbone of the Information Age 
because they can store and process vast amounts of data. However, we must 
remember that the only purpose for storing data is for later use (Pohl, 2004).  
DoD’s computer-based systems do not automatically analyze data; they require 
human interaction to interpret the data provided. Derived data or “context” is the 
key ingredient that is missing (Pohl, 2008, October 21).  Context is the 
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October 21). The JFPASS must answer one important question: Can software 
provide valuable and pertinent information with COAs in order to respond to the 
threat inferred from the intelligence gathered? Basically, the JFPASS must 
provide intelligent information on its own to the WF with no interaction from the 
WF. 
D. Data-centric Environment 
1. Current Situation and the Need for Intelligent Software 
Technology has revolutionized the way the world views force protection.  
The advent of intelligent software has given force protection technology the 
ability to interpret and answer questions.  The need for intelligent software to 
discard irrelevant information and analyze only relevant data is key to timely, 
accurate and useful information for decision-making by the WF. 
There are two primary reasons for software to incorporate intelligent 
software capabilities.  The first is to reduce the current bottleneck in the data 
processing stream.  Over the past 20 years, electronic data storage capabilities 
have greatly increased the availability of timely and relevant information, but they 
have (paradoxically perhaps) increased the time needed to take action.  This 
problem is due to the historic belief that it is the user’s responsibility to interpret 
the data into information and knowledge, aided by the computer-based system.  
In the past, computer systems were designed to store and retrive data, while any 
manipulation was conducted by the users.  This does not, however, provide 
useful information in a context similar to the question or problem initially posed. 
Can the JFPASS provide pertinent intelligent information?  The second reason is 
financial.  The growing complexity of communication and network systems and 
the increasing reliance of organizations on technology information systems 
require research and development of intelligent software for their existence and 
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2. Transition from Data to Information by Intelligent Software 
The interoperability of information systems is an important issue for many 
organizations. It is a major concern for integrating systems both within and 
across organizations, and, in the case of this paper, across the military branches. 
The key deliverable is the movement from data collection and processing to 
providing intelligent information from data.  Within the military, the planning 
process occurs concurrently at multiple echelons in a highly distributed 
environment, which are seriously impeded by: 
 An overwhelming volume of data, 
 Scarce timely and actionable information, 
 Poor vertical and horizontal communication, 
 Uncertainty with respect to the reliability, accuracy and 
completeness of information, and 
 Limited ability to rapidly determine the overall, current state of the 
planning process. (Pohl, 2004) 
This results in time delays, conflicting planning efforts, confusion, wasteful 
use of human resources, and missed opportunities (Pohl, 2004).  This is due to 
the absence of context within the computer systems. The user must interpret and 
manipulate data by adding context.  Unorganized data has low value and is 
usually copious. As movement occurs vertically, we see data increasing in value 
and decreasing in volume. This is due to the elimination of data that provides no 
added value to the specific question of the problem being addressed.  
The JFPASS attempts to provide context in which information can be 
derived from data.  This would be done by integrating COTS systems to build a 
package with significant value to the user. The JFPASS can infer context from 
principal components defined by the user.  These components are location, time, 
history, urgency, activity, culture, identity, and environment.  If fully successful, 
the JFPASS will be able to automatically gather, process, and interpret pertinent 
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Figure 3.   Transition from Data to Knowledge  
(Pohl, 2005) 
The vertical flow depicted in Figure 3 assists in understanding the 
relationship between the user and the computer.  By adding context to data, 
information can be obtained for decision-making.  Information becomes 
knowledge, which allows the WF to build upon the low-level data for the 
institution and creation of rules.  There are distinct differences between human 
and computer analysis of data. Although computer information is defined by the 
parameters set forth by the WF/user, the computer has distinct advantages over 
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Table 1. Advantages of Human Simulation 
Flexibility 
Use is not constrained by the 
parameters of the 
designer/user 
Reliability 
Perhaps not compared to a 
mature system but certainly 
an issue for an experimental 
system 
Responsiveness Production can be faster but quality will suffer 
Ease of use Learning the interface and procedures are simpler 
 
Table 2. Advantages of Computer Simulation 
 
Applicability 
Feasible to simulation more 
complicated and longer sections of 
COA 
Reproducibility Can return to a situation for re-examination 
Traceability 
Traces decisions back to results and 
results back to data and data 
sources 
Speed Runs much faster than real-time, and multiple runs 
Accuracy Learning the interface and procedures are simpler 
 
Regardless of strengths, no information provided by the computer will be 
used to support decision-making unless it also approaches the advantages of the 
human analysis, especially if the intelligent information provided by the software 
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E. Ontology of Intelligent Software 
Ontology is similar to a dictionary or glossary but with greater detail and 
structure that enables computers to process its data. Ontology consists of 
concepts, axioms, and relationships that describe a domain of interest.  That is, 
ontology is a description (like a formal specification of a program) of the concepts 
and relationships that exists for an agent or a community of agents (Gruber, 
1995, November). Loosely translated, ontology is the entire knowledge in a 
particular field.  Ontologies are designed to share knowledge with and among 
agents in a defined field. The JFPASS agents are the COTS components that will 
provide the information to the WF. 
Recent work in Artificial Intelligence (AI) is exploring the use of formal 
ontologies as a way of specifying content-specific agreements for the sharing 
and reuse of knowledge among software entities.  By creating these agreements, 
multiple systems can provide relative and pertinent information for the user to 
make decisions. 
We use common ontologies to describe ontological commitments for a set 
of agents so that they can communicate about a domain of discourse without 
necessarily operating on a globally shared theory (Gruber, 1995, November).  As 
researchers, we say that an agent commits to an ontology if its observable 
actions are consistent with the definitions within the ontology. The idea of 
ontological commitments is based on the Knowledge-level perspective (Gruber, 
1995, November).  However, the user or designer creates the definitions within 
the ontology, thus the human interface still exists.  
The Knowledge Level is a description of an agent’s knowledge that is 
independent of the symbolic representation used internally. Knowledge is 
attributed to agents by observing their actions; an agent "knows" something if it 
acts as if it had the information and is acting rationally to achieve its goals.  The 
"actions" of agents—including knowledge-based servers and knowledge-based 
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interacts with an agent by making logical assertions (tell) and posing queries 
(ask) (Gruber, 1995, November). 
F. Risk 
Typically, risk management has focused on only single systems, and often 
only on development risks.  For Systems of Systems , the approach has to reach 
beyond these boundaries and across the lifecycle from before acquisition to 
operations, sustainment, and retirement.  A venture as important and as complex 
as creating a system-of-systems to provide increased FP involves many types of 
risk.  Both the development and testing efforts will be discussed along with the 
identification of some potential tools to mitigate those risks.  
Figure 4 shows a basic risk management process that can be used to 
monitor and mitigate risk during the development and testing of any program.  
Implementation of this model can assist in elimination of waste. 
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However, the complexity of the JFPASS will require considerations 
beyond those of the typical risk management model. Considerations that should 
be addressed are as follows. 
1. Considerations for Systems of Systems 
Risk management is a good starting point for reviewing how acquisition 
processes deal with Systems of Systems (SoS). Risk analysis is typically an 
early step in an acquisition and for an SoS, that risk analysis is an especially 
critical step. For an SoS, or for the more likely case of a system or component 
that participates in an existing SoS, an effective risk management approach 
should do the following: 
 scale to size and complexity of Systems of Systems ,  
 incorporate dynamics,  
 integrate across full lifecycle from requirements to sustainment, and  
 focus on success as well as failure. (Creel, 2008, June 5) 
2. Scale to Size and Complexity of Systems of Systems 
Most traditional risk management methods cannot address the complexity 
that arises when multiple systems are routinely combined. State-of-the-practice 
risk management approaches provide stakeholders with a long list of potential 
problems (in the form of risks). The list for a single project, program, or 
technology often includes more than 100 statements of risk. For Systems of 
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Table 3. Common Systems of Systems Risk Management Issues  
(Conrow, 2005, February)  
Number Issue Issue Summary 
1 Multiple Stakeholders 
Differences in stakeholder’s behaviors will often lead 
to contention and potentially sub-optimal design 
solutions, funding allocation, schedule priority, and 
increased risk. 
2 Multiple Risk Management Processes 
Differences in risk management processes and their 
implementation can lead to the omission of risks as 
well as exaggeration of other risks. 
3 Long Lifecycles Non-uniform acquisition maturity potentially complicates risk management. 
4 Common Technical Risk Causes 
Technical risks are often examined, evaluated, and 
managed separately, which may not provide insight 
into weaknesses/shortfalls. 
5 Integration Risk 
Integration risk is often not explicitly evaluated. (In 
the case of the JFPASS, this risk would be 
detrimental if ignored.) 
6 Functional Performance Risk 
Functional performance risk is often not explicitly 
evaluated. 
7 Interface Complexity It is generally difficult to evaluate interface complexity and accurately relate it to risk. 
 
The JFPASS must also consider risks associated with existing programs 
of record. DoD acquisition programs already run the gamut from relatively simple 
to very complex. Complex hardware and software interfaces often exist within 
individual programs, as well as in SoSs. While there may be a desire to explicitly 
treat complexity in a risk analysis, it is generally difficult to accurately relate 
complexity to risk.  Furthermore, efforts to estimate the risk of interface 
complexity directly may lead to uncertain, subjective, and/or erroneous results 
(Conrow, 2005, February). 
The JFPASS must also consider the required support for technologies 
under consideration. The primary key in reducing risk is effective communication 
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G. Summary of Chapter IV 
Converting the vast amounts of raw data into comprehensive, actionable 
data is truly what the WF needs from an FP system.  Soldiers can process this 
information themselves and make intelligent decisions but often this is not the 
most efficient use of a limited resource.  This is where the JFPASS seeks to 
provide aide to the WF.  By compiling vast amounts of data and intelligently 
processing it, the JFPASS promises to deliver information to actually support 
operational decisions.  A degree of trust (and, therefore, a level of risk) 
accompanies the WF’s reliance on a machine to help make decisions in life-or-
death situations.  This risk is offset by the reward of enhanced information-
processing power.  By leveraging the JFPASS technologies, more information 
can be processed in a shorter amount of time—yielding more accurate 
information about the threat.  The WF’s task load is then greatly reduced, which 
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V.  Results 
A.  Introduction 
This chapter provides a framework, description, discussion and analysis of 
some issues and factors that must be considered in constructing a new FP 
system in response to the following: How does the use of force protection 
equipment contained in the JFPASS impact force effectiveness?  
Based on preliminary results of the background research (Chapter III), the 
JFPASS plans to create a “fusion cell” concept to control COTS implemented 
with a common communications suite of protocols to provide a common use 
language. Because of the diverse and complex nature of work to be performed, 
the JFPASS will need to craft a strategy that integrates these diverse elements in 
order to meet user requirements. A detailed discussion will address how and why 
specific data was collected by the project team to answer the question previously 
stated. Through the means of a survey, interviews and literature research, we 
obtained an answer.  
It is important to note that the strategy discussion and the analysis below 
do not capture all the issues that must be considered prior to program 
recommendation to OSD. However, they outline considerations that require 
attention and possible solutions, including the WF’s view of the JFPASS. 
B. Demonstration Strategy 
The JFPASS JCTD Demonstration Strategy will consist of both Technical 
and Operational demonstrations.  It will conduct two sets of demonstrations: 
1. Technical Demonstration One (TD-1) will demonstrate the full suite 
of JFPASS JCTD capabilities in preparation for a limited utility 
assessment. 
2. Technical Demonstration Two (TD-2) will be a preparation for the 
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2)/Operational Utility Assessment (OUA).  The Operational 
Problem, Desired Capabilities, CONOPS and TTP drive each 
demonstration. (Guardian Six, 2008, July 11) 
Table 4 depicts the location for each event. 
Table 4. JFPASS JCTD Schedule 
(Guardian Six, 2008, July 21) 
EVENT LOCATION 
Technical Demo 1 Eglin AFB, C3 
Operational Demo 1 Eglin AFB, C3 
Technical Demo 2 Spangdahlem AB 
Operational Demo 2 Spangdahlem AB 
Interim Capability through 
Extended Use  Spangdahlem AB 
 
Technical demonstrations will serve as technical checks and dress 
rehearsals before each operational demonstration (OD).  A period of 
evaluation and internal assessment will follow TD-1 to provide the 
technical team with the information and time necessary to complete 
preparations for OD-1.  OD-1 will serve to highlight the flexibility and 
scalability of the JFPASS JCTD system.  The operational team will 
execute OD-1; this event provides a Limited Operational Utility 
Assessment (LOUA) of the full suite of sensor interfaces, data fusion, 
integration and automation in semi-fixed/expeditionary, and waterside 
environments.  OD-1 may enable early transition of capabilities to the 
WF’s, pending a successful LOUA. TD-2 will serve as the final dress 
rehearsal in preparation for OD-2 and will provide a final Operational Utility 
Assessment (OUA) and report of the JFPASS JCTD capabilities 
(Guardian Six, 2008, July 11). 
C. Operational View 
Conducting the TDs and ODs will provide opportunities for the end users 
to observe and participate in the assessment. They will provide instant feedback 
on the results. The TDs and ODs will provide an operational view of how the 
JFPASS will integrate the system-of-systems approach and how it will increase 
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The operational view (OV), in Figure 5 below, provides a high-level 
illustration of the JFPASS JCTD in its operational environment.  “It depicts the 
operational elements nodes and systems information exchange paths. This view 
serves to support the development of Systems Architecture.  It also illustratively 
describes the CONOPS and supports the development of further CONOPS and 
TTPs” (Guardian Six, 2008, July 11). 
 
Figure 5.   Operational View of the JFPASS 
(Guardian Six, 2008, July 11) 
The researchers would like to note, however, that the operational view 
above assumes theoretical interoperability with zero faults in an ideal battlefield. 
As we know, nothing is perfect and the ability to adapt is crucial to success. The 
key will be to provide the JFPASS with the ability to adapt to an ever-changing 
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D. Analysis 
1.  Importance (Scope) 
In our collection of data, the primary questions concerned the need for the 
JFPASS. As stated in Chapters II and III, the JFPASS will provide the WF with a 
means to increase FP, both in deployed and garrison environments. However, 
the need for the JFPASS could not be easily ascertained from current data due 
to the JFPASS initiative’s early stages of development.  To date, only one TD 
had been conducted, with data needed for a comprehensive CBA, which has not 
yet been available. Taking this into account, we decided to focus on 
effectiveness.  This involved directly polling the WFs (and all those involved with 
the JFPASS) to assess the level of importance of the desired operational 
capabilities to overall mission success. 
2.  Collection 
With the creation and utilization of an operational utility assessment 
model, using a survey featuring direct communication with the operator’s 
experience gave the best source of data. Doing so provided control measures 
already established by the contractor in charge of developing the JFPASS.  
Incorporating a table showing the relationship between key tasks and 
desired capabilities allowed the importance of the JFPASS to be answered by 
the WF, as seen in Figure 6. In doing so, control measures already established 
by the contractor in charge of developing the JFPASS were provided.   
By incorporating a table (Table 5) showing the relationship between key 
tasks and desired capabilities, we are able to demonstrate the importance of the 
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Figure 6.   Mapping Tasks to Capabilities  
(Guardian Six, 2008, July 11) 
The levels of importance were crucial in answering the level of mission 
success that the JFPASS would have from the WF’s perspective. In Appendix A, 
the levels of mission success in relation to each of the five key tasks and eight 
desired capabilities are explained. The following analysis represents a sample 
size of 39 operationally experienced WF’s deployed within the last 24 months.  
Their survey responses can be seen in Appendix D.   
3. Quantitative Analysis Method 
a. Data Interpretation 
In order to derive quantitative results from the survey distributed, we 
wanted to analyze the trend of scores for each desired operational capability (x) 
as compared with the five standard key tasks (y) outlined by the lead agency of 
the program.  Upon reviewing the relative scores of the desired operational 
capabilities, we realized that some further insight could be derived from analyzing 
the standard deviation of these scores to verify what areas most consistently 
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b. Data Analysis 
We first averaged all survey respondent scores in each category and then 
averaged all categories.  We forced the averages in each category to a mean of 
3.0.  This was accomplished by taking the difference between the overall 
average and 3.0 and then subtracting that value from the value in each category.  
This effectively smoothed our results by preventing numerous low scores in a 
category from artificially accentuating a single high score.  Consistent raters, 
therefore, would show the same relative weights as raters with a much greater 
range of scores.   
Upon graphing these forced mean scores against their individual key 
tasks, we began to see a trend depicting which operational traits were most 
important and in which areas their importance was most significant, (see 
Appendix E). 
We wanted to verify that a few high scores were not the cause of these 
inflated averages.  To determine this, we graphed the standard deviation of all 
survey scores by individual desired operational capabilities.  By graphing these 
results in a polar graph, we saw a relative depiction of the amount of variation in 
the desired operational capabilities scores according to the performance 
parameters that our surveys rated against.  The final result can be seen in how 
tight the “shot group” is on the target of zero variation (see Appendix F). 
After building our WF preference analysis, we created a model to compute 
an overall measure of effectiveness.  By defining a field to be filled in once test 
data becomes available, we were able to build a formula from the product of the 
individual capabilities multiplied by the sum of the operational preferences across 
all five standard tasks.  We then summed each product to produce one measure 
of effectiveness score (see Appendix G). 
The overall measure of effectiveness was then plotted on a polar graph 
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Figure 7.   Overall Measure of Effectiveness Shown as a Representation of 
Means Dispersion in a Polar Format  
By graphically plotting the products of the test plan results with operational 
preferences, we have shown an effectiveness dispersion of capabilities.  This 
graph can be used to focus performance development to match WF preferences.  
4. Quantitative Results 
a. Measuring the Results 
Several interesting trends surfaced as a result of analyzing the survey 
responses.  The desired operational capabilities all had a relatively similar level 
of preference from the surveyed WF’s.  This shows that the functional areas 
chosen to survey represent a well-balanced group of emphasis.  However, 
several distinct trends emerged from our survey.  For example, near real-time 
information was clearly the most important factor for our respondents.  Given the 
high preference score for near real time information, as seen in Appendix D, it is 
particularly interesting then that this desired operational capability had the lowest 
standard deviation of survey responses across all the desired operational 
capabilities—leading to the intuitive assumption that knowing what and where the 
threat is occurring leads to greater mission success.  A sample survey from 
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Figure 8.   Sample Survey Format 
All eight desired capabilities were measured using the same personal 
preference assessment.  The results were then placed in the aforementioned 
formula.     
b. Interpreting Results 
The scores in the near real-time category across all key tasks averaged 
46% higher than the scores for the other desired operational capabilities, 
suggesting that timely information is the most important of these traits to the WF 
for mission success; see Appendix B for graphical representation and Appendix 
H for calculations. 
In particular, the detection key task had the single lowest deviation, 
scoring 78% less than the average response.  Numbers like these show a clear 
WF judgment that near real-time information during the detection phase of an 
engagement is the most important component of force protection (see Appendix 
H). 
The key task of recovery received the lowest scores across all desired 
operational capabilities, 23% less than the average evaluation score.  This shows 
that the final phase of force protection is the least critical to the WF when it 
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constrained resources within the FP arena, the interoperability of the Systems of 
Systems  approach that the JFPASS will provide will lead to a level of increased 
security and protection. 
E. Progress and Change 
As mentioned earlier, many of the issues concerning the JFPASS will be 
better understood only with the completion of the TDs and ODs. Changes are 
sure to occur after each TD, driving a change in the timing and outline of the 
follow on ODs.   
As seen in this chapter, the effectiveness of the JFPASS depends on the 
accurate interpretation of the WF’s needs.  The quality of the JFPASS will 
























1. The Need for Better Force Protection Capabilities 
The JFPASS seems to provide much needed advantages in increasing 
security and decreasing the risk of losing lives, equipment, and infrastructure. 
This analysis provides insights about what is most important to the warfighter 
(WF). With the JFPASS, legacy systems can be interfaced with Commercial-off-
the-shelf (COTS) and Force Protection (FP) systems to enable reallocation of 
manpower and reduction of the logistics footprint required to support. 
New systems, no matter how safe, have a learning curve associated with 
their operation and inherently have some risks.  The JFPASS seeks to mitigate 
these risks by tying existing systems together to create a network that can 
provide intelligent information for better decisions.  In this manner, the JFPASS 
avoids the learning curve dangers of other FP systems in early operations. 
Whatever the case may be, lack of manning, training, and experience sometimes 
causes FP systems to be discarded in favor of traditional, labor-intensive FP 
measures such as manning the watch tower. With limited resources, FP must be 
given the tools and methodology to work as efficiently as possible; the JFPASS 
aims to provide this capability. 
2. The Way to Fill the Need of the WF with the JFPASS 
The JFPASS, if successfully tested and fielded, can be tailored as needed 
by the WF. Creating a system that fuses numerous FP systems to one location 
expands situational awareness. This provides the WF more accurate and 
pertinent information that can support decisions to effectively counter the threat. 
The JFPASS provides this ability with compact, portable, modular, and fast 
assembly kits that can be packaged in any form to meet the WF’s needs. This 
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existing FP systems on ground.  The result of structuring the JFPASS this way is 
numerous savings. Reduction in logistic footprint, reduction of transportation 
costs, minimal manning for installation, and reallocation of manpower are only a 
few that are immediately impacted by the JFPASS capability. 
B. Recommendations 
1. What are the Needs that are the Focus of the JFPASS from the WF’s 
Perspective? 
Accurate, real time information is important.  This is especially true in the 
detection phase. Any WF will say that they can defeat the enemy if they know 
when and where the enemy will be and where they are planning to attack. 
However, we know that this information is hardly ever available in a timely 
manner. Many times the enemy will have the advantage due to an inability to 
detect the threat. Thus, in the FP arena, reaction to the threat is typically the 
norm. Anticipating the threat, as opposed to repelling an attack, is the basic 
capability the JFPASS aims to provide. The ability to gain the initiative will allow 
the WF to position assets to counter the threat prior to the engagement.  
Recovery, though a necessary step in the FP process, is the least 
important phase.  The WF is willing to restrict the usage of limited resources in 
this area as it is the most removed from the detection phase. 
2. Work to Mitigate the Risks Associated with the JFPASS 
Given the risk associated with a new system, any work done to reduce 
that risk will pay significant dividends.  For example, redundancies in 
communication or processing will reduce the risk of losing connectivity.  Also, 
storing of data frequently and providing backup power supplies will reduce the 
risk of the consequence of service interruptions (e.g., through primary power 
failure).  As mentioned previously, with human life at stake, the inherent risk 
threshold is low and one of the most significant detractors from accepting the 
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C. Payoff 
The JFPASS supports the GWOT by providing commanders on the 
ground and our joint and coalition partners with a Near Real Time, Integrated/ 
Interoperable, Comprehensive Land and Maritime-based Regional and Local 
Force Protection Systems to counter threats. This is a precedent-setting solution, 
using intelligent technology to work more effectively for the WF. It provides the 
integration of CBRNE and physical security systems through the application of an 
integrated C2 Architecture that uses computer software and tailored decision-
making rules.  The JFPASS provides actionable information and allows the user 
to focus on the response function more quickly and with better accuracy.  
Currently, no other program is capable of integrating the existing COTS 
components and fusing them with service-acquired systems into a single, 
integrated FP system-of-systems. The JFPASS will enhance FP by using 
intelligent information in an expedited manner, allowing the WF to focus on 
orchestrating the response. It also provides the opportunity for future cost 
savings through standardization and the reallocation of manpower. 
D. What is Next for the JFPASS 
Due to the lack of test and cost data, a thorough BCA cannot be 
supported at this time.  As seen in Figure 9, the BCA is broken into two specific 
areas: cost and operational effectiveness (a score).  Our group focused on the 
operational effectiveness portion due to the absence of cost data.  A full 
comparison of effectiveness versus cost is required to complete the BCA as 
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Figure 9.   BCA Diagram 
As test data becomes available, it will be assessed and fed into the 
operational effectiveness model to provide an operational effectiveness score.  
Having this score, formulated from operational experts' judgments of battlefield 
priorities, will allow cost data to be compared in order to analyze different aspects 
of what can be eliminated, reallocated, or reduced in terms of FP.  Comparison of 
effectiveness versus manpower costs can be measured to find out where or if 
reallocation or reduction is a viable option and how much cost savings may be 
realized.  The direct impact of five men versus two men is significant and could 
be measured using the model represented in this project once test data becomes 
available.   
Figure 10 represents the flow process in which data will travel once testing 
is done and acquired for input.  The new data will be collected, assessed, and 
fed into the matrix.  An effectiveness score is produced based on how 
operational experts interpret the key tasks mapped against the desired 
operational capabilities.  The operational effectiveness score calculated then 
provides a useful tool on which to base future decisions.  For example, the score 
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efforts, or it may provide a means to compare similar systems to the JFAPSS.  
The system is currently under testing, but once the tests are completed, the 
results tabulated, and the data analyzed, then the data could be used to revisit 











Figure 10.   Operational Effectiveness Score Flow Chart 
Despite the lack of test data, we conclude that JFPASS has shown clear 
potential to be a highly effective system for providing modernized and enhanced 
FP systems with the ability to meet ever-changing future threats.   
E. Future Research 
It is the authors’ recommendation that this work be added to the body of 
experience and knowledge of the JFPASS JCTD program in order to aid in 
further development research efforts—not only for the JFPASS but for other 
intelligent software exploratory programs as well.  Specifically, future research 
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might investigate why the WF’s place such emphasis on the need for real-time 
information.  Perhaps more insight may be gained into the nature of FP by clearly 
understanding how the WF intends to use near real-time information for 
operational mission enhancement. 
Additionally, further research could help to answer why the WF’s 
responses indicated a general lack of concern for the recovery phase.  Perhaps 
incoming threats are so sporadic that quickly resetting the force is not as much of 
a priority as originally thought.  This could then lead to a more accurately tuned 
system that is specifically geared to react quickly to an initial threat, even at the 
cost of recovery time.  Multiple attacks could occur, however, so the recovery 
phase must not be ignored. 
We conclude by noting that there is a great deal more research that can 
be done on the JFPASS to assist in assessing its potential.  Additional 
methodologies and/or tools can help managers solve the technical and 
engineering challenges that are sure to arise with interfacing COTS systems with 
new software.  As with any new program, there are seldom any standard 
answers; however, there are opportunities to learn from the data and to gain 
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Appendix B. Desired Capabilities Relevance 
Survey Instructions 
JOINT FORCES PROTECTION ADVANCED  
SECURITY SYSTEM (JFPASS) UTILITY ASSESSMENT 
SURVEY 
Please fill in the chart, using the number scale provided, with your own opinion. 
Request return at your earliest opportunity. 
Introduction: 
This survey will be used as a tool to measure the operational capability of the 
JFPASS in comparison to both the status quo (do nothing) and five competing systems. 
This survey is intended to provide a foundation of expert judgment for the establishment 
of a measure of operational utility. For the purpose of this project, this survey is meant to 
be all encompassing, but only a small part of the tests and studies being conducted 
within the JFPASS Joint. This survey will be distributed to persons with operational 
deployment experience via email and personal contact. Risk associated with this survey 
is deemed as minimal to any person who volunteers to participate. No personal 
information is requested or required and any information linking participants with this 
survey will be destroyed or deleted once numerical data is collected. Additionally, 
conclusions derived from the data collected from this survey will be encompassed into 
possible future studies of the JFPASS.  
Purpose: 
For the purpose of this survey, eight desired capabilities are to be assessed with 
respect to their contribution to successfully perform five key tasks.  Your responses will 
then be used to formulate metrics that can be used to assess the relative importance of 
each of those capabilities. While not all capabilities will necessarily have direct relevance 
on a specific task, each task/capability should be weighted. As an operational expert in 
the force projection mission, we ask that you consider the relevance of the capability in 
relation to each specific task.  
What we want from you: 
Our specific project will analyze how each of the desired capabilities improves 
overall ability to provide effective force protection. Force protection is defined here as 
anything that enhances thwarting attempts on US life, property, or infrastructure. 
We want your best judgment of how each of the capabilities in the table below 
contributes to the successful accomplishment of the five force protection tasks.  We 
understand that your assessments are subjective and the return of the survey 
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Definitions: 
A listing and a brief description of the five key tasks and the eight desired 
capabilities are provided below. 
Desired Capabilities:1 
1. Near Real-TTime/Integrated/Interoperable, Comprehensive Land 
and Maritime-based Reg balanced Local Force Protection (FP) 
Systems; Common Operating Picture (COP) tailored to suit the 
user’s information requirements and built from fused sensor and 
other information sources 
2. Scalable FP area of interest to support a single integrated group 
(military and civilian) 
3. Compliance with regional requirements (e.g. laws, regulations, 
SOFAs) 
4. Suite of systems under a central core, ability to share information 
(voice data and video) with subordinate units, higher 
headquarters, and adjacent C2 nodes 
5. Standardized core systems training, common baseline of 
equipment, interface, and training standards which reduces the 
total lifecycle cost of ownership and facilitates the plug and play 
use of components among the Services and our coalition partners 
6. Internationally releasable system suite (between partner nations) 
7. A decision aide to select a system suite for various 
applications/environments 
8. CONOPS and TTPs developed for the employment of the 
integrated system-of-systems 
Tasks: 2 
The JFPASS will be tested against the following tasks, according to each task 
description. 
1. Detect: The JFPASS will demonstrate the ability to detect threats 
using an integrated system of sensors (including cameras, radar, 
and CBRNE detection). This will provide consistent detection 
probability results improved response both in the time required to 
recognize a threat and the ability to do so at greater distances 
from vital assets.   
2. Assess:  The JFPASS will integrate the sensors into an automated 
centrally controlled processing station(s), which will evaluate the 
input from each of the sensor systems.  The JFPASS will 
automate the assessment process by comparing the nature of any 
anomaly detected by the JFPASS system with the current 
understanding of any known threat and the potential for the 
anomaly to become a threat (i.e., presence of explosive 
                                            
1 Guardian Six Headquarters. (2008, July 11). JFPASS joint capabilities technology 
demonstration (JCTD) Management and transition plan (MTP). (Vers. 1.1). Washington, DC: 
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components or precursors).  The JFPASS will then automatically 
provide the system operator with recommended courses of action. 
3. Warn:  The JFPASS will provide situational awareness and 
information for decision makers.  An internet worked system of the 
JFPASS enabled units, bases and installations will disseminate 
warnings via a network in order to mitigate the effects of dispersed 
coordinated attacks.   
4. Defend:  The JFPASS will automate the defense actions by 
centrally managing the deployment of passive defensive 
measures and providing the local commander with situational 
awareness regarding the status of the defensive measures.   
5. Recover: Although the JFPASS will not directly contribute to the 
recovery function, the synergistic effect of integration and 
automation within the other areas of the FP construct will help in 
resuming effective operations and provide a deterrent against 
further attacks. 
 
Numerical Evaluation Scores: (Level importance of task from the operational 
perspective in relation to desired capability)3 
  
 5–Significantly impacts mission success 
 4–Enhances mission success 
 3–Impacts mission success 
 2–Minimal impact on mission success 
 1–No impact on mission success 
 
Every block should receive a numerical value, or will be assumed as no impact. 








                                            
3 Fowler, M. J. (2001, December). Acquisition strategies for aging aircraft: Modernizing the marine 
corps’ CH-53 super stallion helicopter (Master’s Thesis). Monterey, CA: NPS. 
HIGH 
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TASKS WEIGHTING IMPORTANCE4 (Example Format) 
REMEMBER: Each block should have a numerical value assigned. 
 
Instructions for returning:   
1-Download SURVEY FORM.doc and save as JFPASS_SURVEY to your desktop.  
2-Attach saved doc’s to email or mail / fax to: (jbsymmes@nps.edu)                                                   
 Fax: ATTN: NPS JFPASS SURVEY, 831-444-9443                                                                           
 Mail: ATTN: NPS JFPASS SURVEY, 995 Newington St, Salinas CA 93906  
 POC: MAJ Mark McGovern (mtmcgove@nps.edu) 
  
                                            
4 Ibid. 
  
Near Real Time / 
Integrated / 









area of interest 

































DETECT 5 4 3 5 2 3 3 2 
ASSESS 5 4 4 2 5 3 4 4 
WARN 5 5 2 2 3 1 3 1 
DEFEND 5 1 3 4 2 5 5 3 
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Appendix C. Desired Capabilities Relevance 
Survey 
JOINT FORCES PROTECTION ADVANCED SECURITY SYSTEM (JFPASS) UTILITY 
ASSESSMENT SURVEY 
Please fill in the chart, using the number scale provided, with your own opinion.  
Request return at your earliest opportunity. 
 
TASKS WEIGHTING IMPORTANCE5 
Numerical Evaluation Scores: (Level importance of task from the operational 
perspective in relation to desired capability)6 
 5 – Significantly impacts mission success 
 4 – Enhances mission success 
 3 – Impacts mission success 
 2 – Minimal impact on mission success 
 1 – No impact on mission success 
REMEMBER: Each block should have a numerical value assigned. 
Instructions for returning: Note: Return of the survey constitutes consent.  
1-Download SURVEY FORM.doc and save as JFPASS_SURVEY to your desktop.  
                                            
5 Fowler, “Acquisition Strategies for Aging Aircraft. 
6 Ibid. 
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2-Attach saved doc’s to email or mail / fax to: (jbsymmes@nps.edu)                                                   
 Fax: ATTN: NPS JFPASS SURVEY, 831-444-9443   






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 67 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Appendix D. JFPASS Survey Preference Rollup 
 















DETECT 5 4 3 5 2 3 3 2 
ASSESS 5 4 4 2 5 3 4 4 
WARN 5 5 2 2 3 1 3 1 
DEFEND 5 1 3 4 2 5 5 3 
RECOVER 5 3 3 2 2 4 2 1 
         















DETECT 5 4 3 5 2 3 3 2 
ASSESS 5 4 4 2 5 3 4 4 
WARN 5 5 2 2 3 1 3 1 
DEFEND 5 1 3 4 2 5 5 3 
RECOVER 5 3 3 2 2 4 2 1 
         















DETECT 4 2 1 3 2 2 1 2 
ASSESS 4 3 1 3 2 2 3 2 
WARN 4 5 1 4 2 3 3 2 
DEFEND 4 4 1 4 2 2 2 2 
RECOVER 4 2 1 3 2 2 1 2 
         















DETECT 4 2 1 2 3 1 5 4 
ASSESS 4 3 1 2 4 2 4 4 
WARN 4 5 1 2 5 3 3 5 
DEFEND 4 4 1 2 2 4 2 2 
RECOVER 4 2 1 2 1 5 1 1 
         















DETECT 5 5 3 5 4 4 3 2 
ASSESS 5 5 3 5 4 2 3 4 
WARN 5 3 2 4 2 2 3 2 
DEFEND 4 4 2 4 3 2 2 4 
RECOVER 4 3 2 2 3 2 1 1 
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DETECT 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 
ASSESS 5 5 3 3 3 3 5 3 
WARN 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 
DEFEND 5 5 3 5 3 5 5 3 
RECOVER 5 3 1 3 3 2 5 1 
         















DETECT 4 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 
ASSESS 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 
WARN 3 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 
DEFEND 3 2 4 2 3 3 2 3 
RECOVER 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 
         















DETECT 4 4 3 5 5 5 5 4 
ASSESS 5 4 4 5 5 4 5 4 
WARN 4 5 3 5 4 4 4 4 
DEFEND 3 2 2 3 4 3 2 4 
RECOVER 3 2 2 3 4 3 2 4 
         















DETECT 4 4 2 5 5 5 5 5 
ASSESS 5 4 4 5 5 3 5 3 
WARN 4 5 3 5 4 3 2 3 
DEFEND 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 
RECOVER 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 3 
         















DETECT 5 4 1 3 5 1 5 5 
ASSESS 5 4 1 3 5 1 5 5 
WARN 5 4 1 3 5 1 5 5 
DEFEND 5 4 1 3 5 1 5 5 
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DETECT 5 5 4 5 3 2 3 4 
ASSESS 4 3 3 5 3 2 4 3 
WARN 5 5 2 5 3 2 5 4 
DEFEND 4 3 3 5 3 2 5 3 
RECOVER 4 2 2 4 3 2 4 2 
         















DETECT 5 4 5 3 4 5 4 3 
ASSESS 3 3 3 5 5 3 5 2 
WARN 4 2 4 4 3 4 3 5 
DEFEND 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 4 
RECOVER 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
         















DETECT 5 4 2 5 5 5 5 5 
ASSESS 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
WARN 5 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 
DEFEND 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
RECOVER 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
         















DETECT 5 4 2 4 4 3 4 3 
ASSESS 3 4 2 4 3 3 3 3 
WARN 4 5 2 4 3 3 4 3 
DEFEND 5 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 
RECOVER 2 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 
         















DETECT 5 5 1 5 4 3 2 2 
ASSESS 5 4 4 5 5 3 2 3 
WARN 5 4 3 5 5 4 3 2 
DEFEND 5 4 4 5 4 4 2 4 
RECOVER 5 2 1 4 4 1 2 3 
 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 70 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=















DETECT 5 4 3 5 2 3 3 2 
ASSESS 5 4 3 3 5 2 3 4 
WARN 5 4 2 2 3 1 3 3 
DEFEND 5 2 3 5 3 5 5 2 
RECOVER 5 2 3 2 3 4 2 3 
         















DETECT 5 5 3 3 3 2 4 2 
ASSESS 4 2 2 3 2 2 3 1 
WARN 5 2 3 3 2 2 4 1 
DEFEND 4 4 2 3 3 2 3 2 
RECOVER 4 1 2 2 2 2 3 1 
         















DETECT 5 5 4 4 5 3 5 3 
ASSESS 5 5 5 4 5 3 4 3 
WARN 5 5 4 5 5 3 3 3 
DEFEND 5 5 3 3 5 3 5 3 
RECOVER 5 3 4 2 5 3 2 3 
         















DETECT 5 1 5 4 3 3 4 5 
ASSESS 3 3 4 4 3 5 5 1 
WARN 4 5 5 1 4 5 5 1 
DEFEND 5 4 3 3 1 5 3 3 
RECOVER 3 5 3 5 1 3 4 4 
         















DETECT 5 5 3 3 4 2 2 1 
ASSESS 5 4 2 3 4 2 4 1 
WARN 5 5 3 3 3 2 3 1 
DEFEND 5 5 3 3 4 2 2 1 
RECOVER 5 3 2 3 3 2 1 1 
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DETECT 5 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 
ASSESS 4 5 2 2 1 2 2 1 
WARN 5 4 2 3 2 2 2 2 
DEFEND 5 3 2 3 2 2 2 1 
RECOVER 4 5 2 2 1 2 2 1 
         















DETECT 5 3 2 3 2 1 2 1 
ASSESS 4 2 2 3 2 1 1 1 
WARN 5 3 2 2 2 1 2 1 
DEFEND 4 4 2 2 2 1 2 1 
RECOVER 3 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
         















DETECT 5 5 3 2 2 3 3 2 
ASSESS 5 5 2 2 2 1 2 2 
WARN 5 4 3 2 2 2 3 2 
DEFEND 5 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 
RECOVER 4 3 1 2 2 1 1 2 
         















DETECT 5 4 3 5 2 3 3 2 
ASSESS 5 4 4 2 5 3 4 4 
WARN 5 5 2 2 3 1 3 1 
DEFEND 5 1 3 4 2 4 5 3 
RECOVER 5 4 3 2 2 5 2 1 
         















DETECT 5 4 2 4 5 2 1 2 
ASSESS 5 4 2 4 5 2 2 4 
WARN 5 4 2 4 5 2 2 1 
DEFEND 5 4 2 4 5 1 5 1 
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DETECT 5 4 2 4 5 2 1 2 
ASSESS 5 4 2 4 5 2 2 4 
WARN 5 4 2 4 5 2 2 1 
DEFEND 5 4 2 4 5 1 5 1 
RECOVER 5 4 2 4 5 2 2 1 
         















DETECT 5 4 3 5 3 3 3 4 
ASSESS 4 3 5 3 2 2 2 3 
WARN 4 3 4 3 2 2 2 3 
DEFEND 5 4 5 4 5 4 3 4 
RECOVER 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
         















DETECT 5 5 1 3 4 2 4 2 
ASSESS 5 5 1 3 4 2 3 2 
WARN 5 5 1 3 4 2 3 2 
DEFEND 5 5 2 3 4 2 4 2 
RECOVER 5 5 1 3 4 2 2 2 
         















DETECT 5 5 2 4 2 2 4 3 
ASSESS 5 4 2 3 2 2 3 3 
WARN 5 5 2 3 2 2 3 3 
DEFEND 5 5 2 4 2 2 4 3 
RECOVER 5 3 2 3 2 2 3 3 
         















DETECT 5 5 2 3 4 2 4 2 
ASSESS 5 5 2 3 4 2 4 2 
WARN 5 5 2 3 4 2 4 2 
DEFEND 5 5 2 3 4 2 5 2 
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DETECT 5 5 2 3 2 1 4 2 
ASSESS 5 4 2 3 2 1 4 2 
WARN 3 4 2 3 2 1 4 2 
DEFEND 5 5 2 3 2 1 4 2 
RECOVER 2 3 1 3 1 1 2 2 
         















DETECT 5 4 3 5 3 3 3 2 
ASSESS 5 4 4 4 3 3 4 2 
WARN 5 5 2 2 2 3 3 1 
DEFEND 5 3 3 2 5 1 3 3 
RECOVER 5 2 3 2 2 4 2 1 
         















DETECT 5 5 2 4 4 2 4 3 
ASSESS 5 4 2 3 3 2 3 2 
WARN 5 5 2 3 3 2 3 3 
DEFEND 5 5 2 4 4 2 4 3 
RECOVER 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
         















DETECT 5 5 2 4 4 2 2 1 
ASSESS 5 5 2 4 4 2 1 1 
WARN 5 5 2 4 4 2 2 1 
DEFEND 5 5 2 4 4 2 1 1 
RECOVER 5 3 2 4 4 2 2 1 
         















DETECT 5 5 3 4 4 4 2 1 
ASSESS 5 4 3 3 3 2 2 1 
WARN 5 5 2 3 4 3 1 1 
DEFEND 5 5 3 3 4 3 2 1 








do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 74 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=















DETECT 5 5 3 4 4 3 2 2 
ASSESS 5 4 2 3 4 2 2 2 
WARN 5 5 3 2 4 1 2 2 
DEFEND 5 5 3 3 4 3 2 2 
RECOVER 4 3 2 2 3 1 1 1 
         















DETECT 5 5 3 4 3 3 4 2 
ASSESS 4 4 2 3 3 3 3 2 
WARN 5 5 2 3 3 3 2 2 
DEFEND 5 5 3 4 3 3 4 2 
RECOVER 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
         















DETECT 5 4 4 4 4 3 4 2 
ASSESS 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 2 
WARN 5 5 3 4 4 3 3 1 
DEFEND 5 5 4 4 4 3 4 2 
RECOVER 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
         















DETECT 5 4 2 4 3 3 3 3 
ASSESS 4 4 3 4 3 3 2 2 
WARN 5 5 3 4 3 3 3 2 
DEFEND 4 5 5 5 3 4 2 3 
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Appendix E. Survey Preference Results 
 
 
This graph shows the WF preferences of operational capabilities graphed 
according to the five standard key tasks along the X-axis.  This clearly shows a 
preference for near real-time capability.  This graph also shows how the WFs 
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Appendix F. Polar Graph of Standard Deviation 
of Near Real-time Results 
 
 
Figure F-1. Near Real-time 
 
This graph shows the extremely low deviation in responses for the 
importance of the near real time operational capability.  Specifically, the detection 
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Appendix G. Measure of Effectiveness 




         
            
            
Engineers / Contractors 
Performance Measure  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 




























DETECT 3.87 3.50 2.93 3.23 3.06 2.82 3.17 2.75 
ASSESS 3.76 3.39 2.98 3.05 3.10 2.71 3.12 2.76 
WARN 3.81 3.56 2.72 3.00 3.01 2.71 2.91 2.65 




RECOVER 3.21 2.83 2.39 2.61 2.62 2.46 2.42 2.34 
   SUM 18.5 16.6 13.8 15.0 14.8 13.5 14.6 13.2 
Weighted Sum Across All 
Capabilities  18.5 16.6 13.8 15.0 14.8 13.5 14.6 13.2 
            
            
 Overall, MOE Weighted 
Across All Capabilities  120.0 
 
In order to determine an overall measure of effectiveness score, we 
created a field to be filled in once performance data becomes available.  The 
chart above multiplies that performance score by the weighted preference sum 
derived from our surveys.  The total of all these preferences across all 
operational capabilities gives an overall, weighted measure of effectiveness 
score.  This tool could be very useful for analyzing how relative changes in 
specific areas of performance affect the overall system effectiveness.  This tool 
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Appendix H. Measure of Effectiveness Calculation Tool 2 
 
    





















and TTPs sum 
chart 
average
DETECT 0.204 0.806 0.947 0.828 1.023 1.017 1.160 1.035 7.020 0.940 
ASSESS 0.618 0.733 1.085 0.828 1.108 0.810 1.052 1.031 7.265  
WARN 0.574 0.790 0.884 0.977 1.054 1.011 0.918 1.121 7.329  
DEFEND 0.567 0.984 1.031 0.900 1.065 1.211 1.326 1.024 8.107  
RECOVER 1.212 1.034 0.787 0.851 1.199 1.027 0.844 0.920 7.873  
SUM 3.175 4.347 4.733 4.385 5.447 5.076 5.301 5.131   





       
















and TTPs sum  
 DETECT 4.730 4.111 2.404 3.794 3.280 2.560 3.121 2.377 26.378  
 ASSESS 4.407 3.786 2.540 3.268 3.413 2.237 2.987 2.401 25.039  
 WARN 4.543 4.307 2.273 3.101 3.153 2.237 2.831 2.058 24.503 










21.924 18.725 11.529 15.942 15.555 11.537 13.982 10.805   
            
 46.2% higher than the average operational capability sum       
          22.6%  
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These tables point out the statistically significant survey responses.  The low 
standard deviation of near real-time importance during the detection phase is 
highlighted in the top chart.  The bottom chart shows both the importance of near 
real-time detection and the reduced importance of the recovery phase to the WF.  To 
show the order of magnitude of these three significant data points, each has been 
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